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ATTORNEYS' LIABILITY TO CLIENTS'
ADVERSARIES FOR INSTITUTING
FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS: A REASSERTION
OF OLD VALUES
INTRODUCTION
Rapid expansion of liability' and a concomitant rise in the aver-
age damage award have characterized recent tort litigation, espe-
cially in the area of medical malpractice.2 As plaintiffs have been
enriched by this development, so too have their attorneys, who fre-
quently are compensated for their services under contingent fee ar-
rangements. 3 The potential for considerable financial gain may ac-
count for an increased number of apparently frivolous lawsuits,'
which is evidenced by the growing number of situations where de-
fendants subjected to baseless actions have brought countersuits
against their adversaries' attorneys.- Yet, whether brought under
traditional or novel tort theories, such countersuits generally have
been unsuccessful.
This Note will explore the desirability of holding attorneys lia-
ble in tort to their clients' adversaries where frivolous lawsuits have
been conducted.8 To this end, the theories upon which plaintiffs in
I See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS xi (4th ed. 1971). For a discussion of
the expansion in liability under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, see Adamson, Medical
Malpractice: Misuse of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 46 MINN. L. REv. 1043 (1962).
1 See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975, at 59; Adler, Malicious Prosecution Suits as Coun-
terbalance to Medical Malpractice Suits, 21 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 51, 51-53 (1972); Project, The
Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE L.J. 939, 940-42 &
n.4.
3 See Note, Rx for New York's Medical Malpractice Crisis, 11 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB.
467, 479-80 & n.79 (1975).
' See Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack: Liability of Lawyers forInstituting Unjusti-
fied Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 FonRHAm L. REv. 1003, 1008-14 (1977).
1 See cases cited in note 10 infra. See also Lawyers and Doctors Unite to Fight 'Nuisance'
Suits, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1979, at 20, col. 6.
1 See generally Birnbaum, supra note 4; Tell, Doctors Find No Cure in Countersuits,
Nat'l L.J., Feb. 12, 1979, at 1, col. 4; Note, Malicious Prosecution: An Effective Attack on
Spurious Medical Malpractice Claims?, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 653 (1976); Comment,
Attorney Liability for Malicious Prosecution and Legal Malpractice: Do They Overlap?, 8
PAc. L.J. 897 (1977); Note, Physician Countersuits: Malicious Prosecution, Defamation and
Abuse of Process as Remedies for Meritless Medical Malpractice Suits, 45 U. CIN. L. REv.
604 (1976); Comment, Counterclaiming for Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process:
Washington's Response to Unmeritorious Civil Suits, 14 WuA~mr= L.J. 401 (1978). While
most countersuits against attorneys have followed medical malpractice actions, the views
expressed in this Note are intended to apply to all lawsuits alleged to be frivolous.
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countersuits commonly rely will be examined,7 followed by an anal-
ysis of the factors militating against and in favor of holding attor-
neys liable.8 The Note will conclude by proposing an alternative
standard for imposing civil liability upon attorneys who institute
baseless suits.'
THEORIES OF LIABIrry
Malicious Prosecution
The theory most frequently relied upon by plaintiffs seeking
recovery from attorneys for instituting frivolous lawsuits against
them is malicious prosecution.'" To succeed, an individual must
prove that there was a prior action instituted by the defendant, an
absence of probable cause to believe in the validity of the underlying
claim, malice on the part of the defendant, termination of the law-
suit in the plaintiff's favor and injury." While these proof require-
See notes 10-100 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 103-139 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 141-155 and accompanying text infra.
10 For examples of countersuits brought on the theory of malicious prosecution, see Car-
roll v. Kalar, 112 Ariz. 595, 545 P.2d 411 (1976); Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123
Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975); Tool Research & Eng'r Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120
Cal. Rptr. 291 (1975); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978); Spencer
v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596 (La. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 340 So. 2d 990 (1977); Friedman
v. Dozorc, 80 Mich. App. 429, 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978); O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569
P.2d 561 (1977) (en banc) In most cases, malicious prosecution is not the only theory upon
which relief is sought. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa), aff'd mem.,
590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978) (abuse of process, negligence, conspiracy and malicious prosecu-
tion).
" See, e.g., Lyddon v. Shaw, 372 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ill. App. 1978); W. PROSSER, supra
note 1, § 120. The Second Restatement of Torts, which has labelled malicious prosecution
"Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings," defines the tort as follows:
One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation or procurement of civil
proceedings against another is subject to liability to the other for wrongful civil
proceedings if
(a) he acts without probable cause, and primarily for a purpose other than
that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are
based, and
(b) except when they are ex parte, the proceedings have terminated in favor
of the person against whom they are brought.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1977). While the basic elements of this tort appear
to be consistent throughout American jurisdictions, neither the Illinois nor the Restatement
definition has been adopted universally; the elements are stated differently in various juris-
dictions. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (N.D. Iowa), aff'd mem., 590
F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978); Tool Research & Eng'r Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 682,
120 Cal. Rptr. 291, 296 (1975). See generally 1 T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS
319-53 (3d ed. 1906); 3 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW: LiABiLrrY & Litigation §§ 41.02-.08
(1977 & Supp. 1978); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 4.8 (1956); R. MALLEN
& V. Levit, Legal Malpractice § 45 (1977 & Supp. 1979); W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 120.
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ments apparently exist in all jurisdictions, they have received diver-
gent judicial interpretation.
Although the "lack of probable cause" requirement1" clearly is
not satisfied merely by proving that the earlier suit terminated fa-
vorable to the plaintiff, 3 it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove
that the defendant's attorney knew that probable cause did not
exist. As the Second Restatement of Torts states, an individual has
probable cause to institute an action if he "correctly or reasonably
believes that under those facts the claim may be valid under the
applicable law. . . ...4 Consistent with this definition, courts have
held that a lack of probable cause may be found where no reasonable
attorney would believe a particular claim to be tenable. This rule
nevertheless affords an attorney considerable latitude," since it per-
mits him to advocate a doubtful legal position.17 It is likely, there-
The tort of malicious prosecution is said to have developed as the result of an attempt
to balance two competing social interests:
The first is the interest of society in the efficient enforcement of the. . . law, which
requires that private persons who aid in the enforcement of the law should be given
an effective protection against the prejudice which is likely to arise from the termi-
nation of the prosecution in favor of the accused. The second is the interest which
the individual citizen has in being protected against unjustifiable and oppressive
litigation of criminal charges, which not only involve pecuniary loss but also distress
and loss of reputation.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 29, introductory note, at 380 (1938); accord, Crim v. Crim, 101
So. 2d 845, 848 (Ala. App. 1958); Wilson v. Yono, 65 Mich. App. 441, 443, 237 N.W.2d 494,
496 (1975). This principle also has been expressed in malicious prosecution actions based
upon prior civil proceedings. See Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 922, 123 Cal. Rptr.
237, 240 (1975).
12 See, e.g., Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 194 (1878); Wilcox v. Gilmore, 320 Mo.
980, 986, 8 S.W.2d 961, 962 (1928); Baird v. Intermountain School Fed. Credit Union, 555
P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1976); 1 T. COOLEY, supra note 11, at 321-28; 3 J. DOOLEY, supra note 11,
§ 41.07; 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., supra note 11, § 4.8, at 329; R. MALLEN & V. LEvIr,
supra note 11, § 45, at 74-76; W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 120, at 854-55.
23 See O'Malley-Kelly Oil & Auto Supply Co. v. Gates Oil Co., 73 Colo. 140, 214 P. 398
(1923); Barton v. Woodward, 32 Idaho 375, 182 P. 916 (1919); Milner v. Hare, 125 Me. 460,
134 A. 628 (1926); Novick v. Becker, 4 Wis. 2d 432, 90 N.W.2d 620 (1958). An unfavorable
termination, even if reversed on appeal, conclusively establishes the existence of probable
cause. See, e.g., Crescent City Live-Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union Slaughter-House Co., 120
U.S. 141 (1887); Boothby Realty Co. v. Haygood, 269 Ala. 549, 114 So. 2d 555 (1959); Overton
v. Combs, 182 N.C. 4, 108 S.E. 357 (1921).
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 675, at 458 (1977) (emphasis added).
25 E.g., Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 924, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 242 (1975) (quoting
Tool Research & Eng'r Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 683-84, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291,
297 (1975)).
11 See Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 123 Minn. 17, 33, 142 N.W. 930, 936 (1913)
(quoting Eickhoff v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 74 Minn. 139, 142, 76 N.W. 1030, 1031 (1898)).
11 An attorney ethically may urge change in unsettled law. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSmmrrY EC 7-2.
1979]
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fore, that a court will defer to an attorney's judgment in any in-
stance where the question of probable cause is unclear. 8
One of the more ambiguous elements of a malicious prosecution
claim 9 is the requirement that the plaintiff prove that malice moti-
vated the defendant to conduct the prior action."0 The ambiguity
surrounding this requirement emanates from the term "malice." '2'
While malice has been given many definitions, 22 it appears that
impropriety of motive is the most appropriate to malicious prosecu-
tion.23 Similarly, the Restatement provides that the culpable mental
state required for a malicious prosecution action exists when "the
proceedings . . .have been initiated or continued primarily for a
purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the
claim on which they are based. 12 4 Thus, if the individual instituting
a suit knows his claim lacks merit, his purpose in bringing it cannot
be proper.2 5 While the courts allow juries to infer malice from a lack
11 While it may be difficult to demonstrate an absence of probable cause, the plaintiff
in a malicious prosecution action has the burden of proving it only by a preponderance of
the evidence. Hunter v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 129 W. Va. 302, 310, 40 S.E.2d 332, 337
(1946).
,o See Griswold v. Home, 19 Ariz. 56, 69, 165 P. 318, 323 (1917).
20 See id.; 3 J. DOOLEY, supra note 11, § 41.08; 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., supra note
11, § 4.8, at 328-29; R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 11, § 45, at 76; W. PROSSER, supra
note 1, § 120, at 855.
23 "Malice" may refer to either malice in fact or malice in law. In the context of malicious
prosecution actions, malice in fact, or actual malice, refers to "an improper motive. . . and
is sufficiently established if it appears that the former suit was commenced in bad faith to
vex, annoy or harass the adverse party." Masterson v. Pig'n Whistle Corp., 161 Cal. App. 2d
323, 338, 326 P.2d 918, 928 (1958). In contrast, malice in law, or legal malice, only requires
proof of "a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse. . . ." Griswold v.
Home, 19 Ariz. 56, 69, 165 P. 318, 323 (1917). Although malicious prosecution actions appar-
ently require proof of actual malice, see R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 11, § 45, at 76,
such malice may be inferred from a lack of probable cause. Griswold v. Home, 19 Ariz. 56,
69, 165 P. 318, 323 (1917); see note 26 and accompanying text infra. For a general discussion
of the various constructions accorded "malice," see Fridman, Malice in the Law of Torts, 21
MOD. L. REV. 484 (1958).
See generally Fridman, supra note 21; W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 120, at 855.
2 See, e.g., Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 473, 71 N.W. 558, 562 (1897).
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 676 (1977).
1 Id., Comment c. According to the Comment, other instances where an individual's
purpose in resorting to the courts cannot be justified arise when
[(1)] the proceedings are begun primarily because of hostility or ill will ...1;
(2)] the proceedings are initiated solely for the purpose of depriving the person
against whom they are brought of a beneficial use of his property . . .[; (3)] the
proceedings are initiated for the purpose of forcing a settlement that has no relation
to the merits of the claim .. .[; and (4)] a defendant files a counterclaim .. .
solely for the purpose of delaying expeditious treatment of the original cause of
action.
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of probable cause,26 the converse inference is not permitted.27
Another element that must be proved in a malicious prosecu-
tion claim is that the prior action terminated in the plaintiff's
favor.? Thus, failure to allege favorable termination is fatal to the
plaintiff's claim,29 as is an out-of-court settlement. 0 The need for
favorable termination eliminates the possibility of malicious prose-
cution forming the basis of a counterclaim in the original lawsuit.3'
Arguments in favor of the rule against such counterclaims include
a desire to prevent expansion of the tort,3 2 a fear of inconsistent
determinations of the two claims3 and a fear that the main claim
will be prejudiced.3
Perhaps the most controversial element of a malicious prosecu-
tion action is the injury requirement. 5 The "English" rule, adopted
by a substantial minority of jurisdictions, requires proof of interfer-
ence with person or property or some other special injury that nor-
mally does not result from the defense of lawsuits. One reason
21 R. MA N. & V. LEv=T, supra note 11, § 45, at 76.
" Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 194 (1878); Bill Edwards Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Carey,
244 S.E.2d 767, 773 (Va. 1978); W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 120, at 855.
23 See, e.g., Paint Prods. Co. v. Minwax Co., 448 F. Supp. 656, 658 (D. Conn. 1978);
Earlywine v. Strickland, 145 Ga. App. 626, 626, 244 S.E.2d 118, 119 (1978); Braun v. Pepper,
224 Kan. 56, 58, 578 P.2d 695, 698 (1978); R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 11, § 45, at 74
& n.34; W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 120, at 853-54.
See, e.g., Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 845, 479 P.2d 379, 381, 92 Cal. Rptr.
179, 181 (1971) (en banc); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 819, 372 N.E.2d 685, 688
(1978).
31 E.g., Baird v. Aluminum Seal Co., 250 F.2d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 1957); Kurek v. Kavan-
agh, Scully, Sudow, White & Frederick, 50 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 1038, 365 N.E.2d 1191, 1194
(1977).
3, Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 846, 479 P.2d 379, 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 181
(1971) (en bane); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 947, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1372 (1978).
But see Herendeen v. Ley Realty Co., 75 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947), discussed
in Note, Counterclaim for Malicious Prosecution in the Action Alleged to be Malicious, 58
YALE L.J. 490 (1949).
22 Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 847, 479 P.2d 379, 382, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 182
(1971) (en banc).
" Id.
3 Id.; see Note, Malicious Prosecution: An Effective Attack on Spurious Medical Mal-
practice Claims?, 26 CASE W. RES. L. Rav. 653, 656 (1976).
See generally 1 T. COOLEY, supra note 11, at 348-52; 3 J. DOOLEY, supra note 11, §§
41.03-.04; 1 F. HARER & F. JAMEs, JR., supra note 11, § 4.8, at 326-28; W. PROSSER, supra
note 1, § 120, at 855-56.
1 Special damages may be distinguished from general damages as follows:
General damages are those which necessarily and by implication of law result from
the injury caused by the wrongful act. Damages for pain and suffering, physical
disability, and impairment of future earning capacity are classified as general dam-
ages.
. . . Special damages are those that are the natural but not the necessary result of
1979]
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offered for the existence of this rule is that civil procedure in Eng-
land generally requires the losing party to pay the costs, including
attorney's fees, of the prevailing party. Proof of special injury is
necessary, therefore, in order to justify any additional recovery.3 7 In
contrast, a showing of general damages is sufficient for recovery
under the "American" rule." Adopted by a majority of jurisdictions,
this rule has been considered to be more appropriate to the Ameri-
the wrongful act, and include such items as medical expenses, hospital bills, costs
of nursing services, actual loss of earnings, and other expenses incurred because of
the injuries.
3 L. FRUMER, R. BENOIT & M. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY § 3.01 [1] - [2] (1965).
At least seventeen jurisdictions adhere to the English rule. See Davis v. Boyle Bros., 73
A.2d 517 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950); Price v. Fidelity Trust Co., 74 Ga. App. 836, 838, 41
S.E.2d 614, 616 (1947); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 366 Ill. 247, 250, 8 N.E.2d 668, 670 (1937);
Wetmore v. Mellinger, 64 Iowa 741, 744, 18 N.W. 870, 871 (1884); Harter v. Lewis Stores, Inc.,
240 S.W.2d 86, 87 (Ky. 1951); North Point Constr. Co. v. Sagner, 185 Md. 200, 207, 44 A.2d
441, 444 (1945); Potts v. Imlay, 4 N.J.L. 330, 334 (1816); Johnson v. Walker-Smith Co., 47
N.M. 310, 312, 142 P.2d 546, 547 (1943); Burt v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 1, 5, 73 N.E. 495, 496 (1905),
appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 129 (1906); Cincinnati Daily Tribune Co. v. Bruck, 61 Ohio St.
489, 490, 56 N.E. 198, 199 (1900) (per curiam); Carnation Lumber Co. v. McKenney, 224 Or.
541, 546, 356 P.2d 932, 934 (1960); Norcross v. Otis Bros. & Co., 152 Pa. 481, 486, 25 A. 575,
575 (1893); Ring v. Ring, 102 R.I. 112, 114-15, 228 A.2d 582, 584 (1967); Smith v. Adams, 27
Tex. 28, 30 (1863); Petrich v. McDonald, 44 Wash. 2d 211, 217, 266 P.2d 1047, 1050 (1954);
Myhre v. Hessey, 242 Wis. 638, 647-49, 9 N.W.2d 106, 110 (1943). For a discussion of the
various interpretations given the English rule by states that currently follow it, see Note,
Malicious Prosecution: An Effective Attack on Spurious Medical Malpractice Claims?, 26
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 653, 658 (1976).
11 See Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1022. For a discussion of the difference between the
English and American approaches to litigation costs, see Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849
(1929); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of
Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 619-21 (1931).
38 While not all jurisdictions have addressed the injury requirement specifically, it ap-
pears that most states follow the American rule. See Kraft v. National Sur. Co., 75 F.2d 141,
143 (9th Cir. 1935) (interpreting Alaska law); Pearson v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 201 Ala. 348,
348, 78 So. 204, 204 (1917); Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 114-15, 15 P.2d 966, 967
(1932); Leek v. Brasfield, 226 Ark. 316, 318-19, 290 S.W.2d 632, 633 (1956); Eastin v. Bank
of Stockton, 66 Cal. 123, 126-27, 4 P. 1106, 1109 (1884); Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 465,
15 P.2d 1084, 1085 (1932) (en banc); Calvo v. Bartolotta, 112 Conn. 396, 397, 152 A. 311, 311
(1930); Tatum Bros. Real Estate & Inv. Co. v. Watson, 92 Fla. 278, 289, 109 So. 623, 626
(1926); McCardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538, 540-51 (1882); Carbondale Inv. Co. v. Burdick,
67 Kan. 329, 337, 72 P. 781, 784 (1903); Graffagnini v. Shnaider, 164 La. 1108, 1111-12, 115
So. 287, 288 (1927); Moulton v. Lowe, 32 Me. 466, 466 (1851); White v. Dingley, 4 Mass. 433,
435 (1808); Brand v. Hinchman, 68 Mich. 590, 596, 36 N.W. 664, 667 (1888); O'Neill v.
Johnson, 53 Minn. 439, 442, 55 N.W. 601, 602 (1893); Harvill v. Tabor, 240 Miss. 750, 754,
128 So.2d 863, 864 (1961); Brady v. Ervin, 48 Mo. 533, 535 (1871); McCormick Harvester
Mach. Co. v. Willan, 63 Neb. 391, 394, 88 N.W. 497, 498 (1901); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461,
470, 71 N.W. 558, 561 (1897); Johnson v. Moser, 181 Okla. 75, 75, 72 P.2d 715, 716 (1937)
(per curiam); Cisson v. Pickens Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 258 S.C. 37, 43, 186 S.E.2d 822, 825
(1972); Teesdale v. Liebschwager, 42 S.D. 323, 324, 174 N.W. 620, 621 (1919); Lipscomb v.
Shofner, 96 Tenn. 112, 115-16, 33 S.W. 818, 819 (1896); Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209, 221-22
(1869); Hunter v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 129 W. Va. 302, 315, 40 S.E.2d 332, 339 (1946).
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can system, which, with few exceptions, requires each party to pay
its own litigation costs."
Notwithstanding the increasing frequency with which mali-
cious prosecution actions are brought against attorneys, instances
in which recovery has been allowed are very rare." This theory is
disfavored by the courts," and, therefore, its elements are strictly
construed.2 The difficulty imposed by the English injury rule is
exemplified by Pantone v. Demos,43 a recent Illinois decision. The
malpractice action that gave rise to the countersuit in Pantone was
brought by the husband of a woman who had died as a result of
complications experienced during childbirth and alleged negligence
on the part of two physicians, each of whom had seen the decedent
on only one occasion for purposes unrelated to her death." Following
summary disposition of the suits in the physicians' favor,4' a mali-
" The distinction between the English and American practices regarding litigation costs
was decisive to a Vermont court's determination of which injury rule to adopt. The court
explained its rationale for selecting the American rule as follows:
The early English cases show very clearly that before the statutes entitling
defendants to costs existed, [principally the Statute of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. 3, c.6
(1267),] they had a remedy at common law for injuries sustained by reason of suits
which were malicious and without probable cause. It would seem, however, from
the more recent decisions, that the present English rule, which restricts or limits
the right of action for maliciously prosecuting civil suits without probable cause,
stands mainly upon the ground that the costs, which the statute provides the
successful defendant shall recover, are an adequate compensation for the damages
he sustains ....
Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209, 217-18 (1869). But see Rice v. Day, 34 Neb. 100, 102-03, 51
N.W. 464, 465 (1892).
10 See Note, Malicious Prosecution: An Effective Attack on Spurious Medical Malprac-
tice Claims?, 26 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 653, 656 (1976).
"1 E.g., Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 822, 372 N.E.2d 685, 690 (1978); Gore v.
Condon, 87 Md. 368, 375, 39 A. 1042, 1044 (1898); Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J.
Super. 139, 152, 83 A.2d 246, 253 (1951); Note, Counterclaim for Malicious Prosecution in
the Action Alleged to be Malicious, 58 YALE L.J. 490, 494 (1949).
42 E.g., Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 821-22, 372 N.E.2d 685, 690 (1978). The
English damages rule, which has survived in a considerable number of jurisdictions, see note
36 supra, exemplifies the strict construction given to the elements of malicious prosecution.
" 59 ll. App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978).
" Id. at 330, 375 N.E.2d at 481. One of the physicians, a radiologist, had seen the
decedent for the sole purpose of performing a chest x-ray. The other physician had prepared
the decedent for childbirth. Id.
"1 Id. at 330-31, 375 N.E.2d at 482. In the malpractice action, the radiologist requested
an admission that he had only seen the decedent on one occasion and that he was not
responsible for her death in any way. Id. at 330, 375 N.E.2d at 481-82. The plaintiff, who was
the decedent's widower, refused to make any admissions until after the radiologist's deposi-
tion was taken. The deposition was never taken, and summary judgment was granted. Id.,
375 N.E.2d at 482. Subsequently, the action against the other physician also was summarily
dismissed. Id.
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cious prosecution action was instituted. In seeking recovery, the
physicians contended that they had suffered "special injury in the
form of damage to their professional reputations and an expectation
that they [would] be required to pay increased premiums for medi-
cal malpractice insurance" in the future." The trial court dismissed
the suit for want of an allegation of special injury.47
On appeal, the Pantone court affirmed, viewing the physicians'
injury allegations as conclusory, rather than as a statement of par-
ticular facts "demonstrating. . . actual or potential harm. 48 The
court also rejected the contention that damage to reputation and
increased insurance premiums are sufficient to satisfy the special
injury requirement, since the injuries allegedly suffered were "such
as the law implies and presumes to have accrued from the wrong
complained of" and therefore were general in nature.49
Abuse of Process
Abuse of process 0 may be defined as the malicious misuse of
lawfully issued process to attain a collateral objective not counte-
"5 Id. at 336, 375 N.E.2d at 485. While Illinois falls within the minority of jurisdictions
that require proof of more than general damages in order to recover in malicious prosecution,
proof of special damages, see note 36 supra, is sufficient to warrant recovery. Interference with
person or property, which is required in some states adhering to the minority rule, need not
be demonstrated. See Schwartz v. Schwartz, 366 Ill. 247, 250, 8 N.E.2d 668, 670 (1937).
"7 59 Ill. App. 3d at 336-37, 375 N.E.2d at 485-86.
"Id. at 336, 375 N.E.2d at 485.
"Id. at 336-37, 375 N.E.2d at 486. See also 3 L. FRUMER, R. BENorr & M. FRIEDMAN,
PERSONAL INJURY § 3.01 [1] - [2] (1965), quoted in note 36 supra. The plaintiffs in Pantone
did not rely solely upon malicious prosecution in seeking redress. Two other theories also were
urged upon the court. The first alternative theory did not conform to any of the traditional
torts; rather, the plaintiffs sought recovery for the wilful and wanton filing of a civil suit
against them. 59 Ill. App. 3d at 331, 375 N.E.2d at 482. This claim was based in part upon a
provision in the Illinois Constitution guaranteeing a legal remedy for all injuries. Id. at 332,
375 N.E.2d at 482-83 (quoting ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 12). The court rejected this claim, however,
and concluded that it would not create a new cause of action. Id. at 332-35, 375 N.E.2d at
483-85.
Another theory upon which recovery was sought was professional negligence, which was,
essentially, a claim of legal malpractice. Noting that "in a majority of states it is still the
rule that an attorney may not be liable for professional negligence to persons other than their
[sic] clients. .. " id. at 335, 375 N.E.2d at 485 (citation omitted), the court opted to follow
the majority, feeling that such a course would preserve "free access to the courts." Id. For a
discussion of an attorney's liability to nonclients in negligence, see note 100 infra.
m See generally 1 T. CooLEY, supra note 11, at 348-52; PROSSER, supra note 1, § 120, at
855-56; Note, Abuse of Process -A Misunderstood Concept, 20 CLEy. ST. L. REv. 401 (1971);
Comment, Abuse of Process, 16 N.C.L. Rav. 277 (1938); Note, The Nature and Limitations
of the Remedy Available to the Victim of a Misuse of the Legal Process: The Tort of Abuse
of Process, 2 VAL. U.L. REv. 129 (1968).
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nanced by the law,51 resulting in damage to the person against whom
it is used.52 Thus, the use of process toward a legally permissible end
cannot be an abuse of process, notwithstanding an underlying vi-
cious purpose.53 There apparently is a great similarity between
abuse of process and malicious prosecution. Both theories require
proof of malice 4 and that the defendant was motivated by an impro-
per purpose. 5 In an abuse of process action, however, malice may
be shown by merely demonstrating an improper purpose." The ele-
ments common to abuse of process and malicious prosecution have
caused many courts to confuse the two theories57 and upon occasion
to equate them. 8 Important differences nevertheless exist, making
them applicable to different types of situations. 9
One significant difference is that the plaintiff in an abuse of
process suit need not prove that there was no probable cause for the
1, E.g., Paint Prods. Co. v. Minwax Co., 448 F. Supp. 656, 659 (D. Conn. 1978); Hoppe
v. Klapperich, 28 N.W.2d 780, 786 (Minn. 1947); see RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 682
(1977); W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 121, at 857. Grainger v. Hill, 132 Eng. Rep. 769 (C.P.
1838), generally is recognized as the first case decided on the theory of abuse of process.
52 E.g., Italian Star Line, Inc. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 53
F.2d 359, 361 (2d Cir. 1931); Andrew v. George Muse Clothing Co., 44 Ga. App. 291, 292, 161
S.E. 296, 296 (1931); Ledgehill Homes, Inc. v. Chaitman, 348 Mass. 777, 777, 202 N.E.2d 920,
920 (1964).
3 E.g., Gambocz v. Apel, 102 N.J. Super. 123, 128-31, 245 A.2d 507, 510 (1968); Edwards
v. Jenkins, 101 S.E.2d 410, 412 (N.C. 1958); J.C. Penney Co. v. Gilford, 422 S.W.2d 25, 31
(Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
5, E.g., Sarvold v. Dodson, 237 N.W.2d 447, 448 (Iowa 1976); Lambert v. Breton, 127 Me.
510, 514, 144 A. 864, 866 (1929).
'5 See notes 12-18, 50-51 and accompanying text supra.
"See Baker v. Oklahoma Tire & Supply Co., 344 F. Supp. 780, 784 (W.D. Ark. 1972).
While some courts have found the malice requirement satisfied by the mere demonstration
of wilful abuse, see Clikos v. Long, 231 Ala. 424, 428, 165 So. 394, 397 (1936); Coplea v. Bybee,
290 111. App. 117, 125-26, 8 N.E.2d 55, 59-60 (1937), other courts have held that a finding of
wilful abuse justifies an inference of malice. See, e.g., Tranchina v. Arcinas, 78 Cal. App. 2d
522, 526, 178 P.2d 65, 68 (1947). Indeed, the elements of abuse of process sometimes are stated
in the terms "improper purpose," without any mention of a malice requirement at all. See,
e.g., Baker v. Oklahoma Tire & Supply Co., 344 F. Supp. 780, 784 (W.D. Ark. 1972); 1 T.
COOLEY, supra note 11, at 355-56. Since malice apparently does not hae to be proved as a
discrete element, the differences in treatment may be viewed as primarily semantic. An
analogous inference of malice is permitted in malicious prosecution actions. See note 26 and
accompanying text supra.
1, E.g., Italian Star Line v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 53 F.2d
359, 361 (2d Cir. 1931); Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (N.D. Iowa), aff'd mem.,
590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978).
I See, e.g., Delk v. Colonial Fin. Co., 118 Ohio App. 451, 454, 194 N.E.2d 885, 887,
appeal dismissed, 175 Ohio St. 248, 193 N.E.2d 153 (1963). But see Avco Delta Corp. v.
Walker, 22 Ohio App. 2d 61, 65-66, 258 N.E.2d 254, 257 (1969) (quoting 1 AM. JuR. 2d Abuse
of Process § 2 (1962)). See generally Note, Abuse of Process - A Misunderstood Concept, 20
CLEv. ST. L. Rav. 401 (1971).
1, See Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1034.
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issuance of process." Indeed, abuse of process is appropriate in situ-
ations where probable cause exists for the issuance of process, but
its subsequent use is wrongful. 1 Another distinction between the
two actions is that the plaintiff in an abuse of process action need
not show that he was able to prevail against the prior abuse.12 The
essential difference between the two torts, therefore, relates to the
point at which the improper purpose is effectuated. In abuse of
process, the tortfeasor's vicious intent is carried out after the right-
ful issue of process.63 In contrast, vicious intent in a malicious prose-
cution action is manifested in the resort to the judicial process it-
self. 4
Abuse of process generally will not be available to an individual
claiming to have been wrongfully sued, because the gravamen of the
complaint is that the prior action was initiated without legal justifi-
10 Voytko v. Ramada Inn, 445 F. Supp. 315, 324-25 (D.N.J. 1978); Moore v. Michigan
Nat'l Bank, 368 Mich. 71, 75, 117 N.W.2d 105, 106 (1962); W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 121,
at 856. The Restatement (Second) of Torts distinguishes abuse of process from malicious
prosecution as follows:
The gravamen of the misconduct for which. . . liability. . . is imposed is not
the wrongful procuremeht of legalprocess or the wrongful initiation of criminal or
civil proceedings; it is the misuse of process, no matter how properly obtained, for
any purpose other than that which it was designed to accomplish. Therefore, it is
immaterial that the process was properly issued, that it was obtained in the course
of proceedings that were brought with probable cause and for a proper purpose, or
even that the proceedings terminated in favor of the person instituting . . . them.
The subsequent misuse of the process, though properly obtained, constitutes the
misconduct for which . . . liability is imposed ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682, Comment a (1977).
11 For an example of a case that emphasizes the appropriateness of abuse of process in
instances where legally issued process is used subsequently to achieve an improper end, see
Sachs v. Levy, 216 F. Supp. 44, 46 (E.D. Pa. 1963). See also note 72 infra. An abuse of process
action founded upon a prior civil suit might arise where an individual who was sued brought
an independent action against his adversary in order to force a settlement of the original suit.
See Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 229-30, 317 P.2d 613, 625 (1957) (en banc).
02 E.g., Lodges 743 & 1746, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 F.2d
422, 465 n.85 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976); Voytko v. Ramada Inn, 445 F.
Supp. 315, 324-25 (D.N.J. 1978). It has been held that an individual who is coerced into
satisfying a debt by being arrested may bring an abuse of process action against those who
procured his arrest. See Ash v. Cohn, 119 N.J.L. 54, 58, 194 A. 174, 176 (1937).
13 E.g., Smith v. Nelson, 255 Ark. 641, 644, 501 S.W.2d 769, 770 (1973); Wood v. Bailey,
144 Mass. 365, 368, 11 N.E. 567, 577 (1887); Abernethy v. Bums, 210 N.C. 636, 639, 188 S.E.
97, 98 (1936). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 121, at 857.
0, See note 53 and accompanying text supra. Occasionally, there may be instances in
which both abuse of process and malicious prosecution will lie. See Jennings v. Shuman, 567
F.2d 1213, 1217-19 (3d Cir. 1977); W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 121, at 857. For example, an
abuse of process action may be maintained even where the initial resort to the judicial
process was wrongful. See, e.g., Ash v. Cohn, 119 N.J.L. 54, 57, 194 A. 174, 176 (1937); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682, Comment a (1977), quoted in note 60 supra. The torts
nevertheless redress different abuses.
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cation. These facts constitute a malicious prosecution claim, 5 and
recovery in abuse of process has been denied for this reason." An
abuse of process claim recently met such a fate in Bickel v. Mackie, 11
wherein a physician brought an action against a patient and her
attorney following the summary dismissal of a medical malpractice
suit that the patient had brought against him. The physician
claimed that an abuse of process had occurred in the form of the
baseless action itself, which allegedly had been brought for the ul-
terior motive of forcing an out-of-court settlement. The defendant-
attorney moved for a judgment on the pleadings, contending that
the abuse of process claim merged with an alternative claim in
malicious prosecution. 9 In granting this motion, the court stated
that "abuse of process has been held to require a purpose to secure
a collateral benefit not directly related to the- process.""0 The court
noted that the prior action, "even if frivolous as pleaded, [had] the
purpose of settlement which is includable in the goals of proper
process."'" On the facts presented, relief would be available, if at all,
only in malicious prosecution. 2
"1 See Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, 68 Mich. App. 360, 367, 242 N.W.2d 775, 778 (1976);
R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 11, § 46, at 77; Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1040.
16 See, e.g., Joseph v. Markovitz, 27 Ariz. App. 122, 126, 551 P.2d 571, 575 (1976); Drago
v. Buonagurio, 61 App. Div. 2d 282, 285, 402 N.Y.S.2d 250, 252 (3d Dep't), rev'd on other
grounds, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978).
447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa), aff'd mem., 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 1383.
" Id. at 1379.
70 Id. at 1383.
71 Id.
71 Id. The plaintiff in Bickel relied upon several tort theories in addition to abuse of
process, a practice often seen in countersuits against attorneys. See, e.g., Norton v. Hines,
49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975); O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d
561 (1977) (en banc). Great reliance was placed upon malicious prosecution, the essence of
the plaintiff's claim being that "the malpractice suit [had been] filed and prosecuted reck-
lessly and with heedless disregard for or indifference to [his] rights . . . ." 447 F. Supp. at
1378. Unfortunately, the plaintiff's complaint failed to allege special injury as required in
Iowa, which follows the "English" injury rule. See notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra.
The plaintiff, while aware of Iowa's adherence to the English rule, claimed it to be outmoded
and urged the court to reconsider the rule in light of the fact that it is followed by only a
minority of jurisdictions. 447 F. Supp. at 1379-80. Noting the absence of Iowa precedent to
suggest such a change, the reluctance of other jurisdictions to change and the capacity of the
legislature to institute reforms, the court rejected the plaintiff's plea. Id. at 1380-81.
Relief also was sought on negligence grounds. The plaintiff's argument was based on the
abolition of the privity requirement in Iowa and on the fact that a cause of action in negli-
gence against a professional by a third party previously had been recognized. Id. at 1381
(citing Freese v. Lemon, 210 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa 1973)). Notwithstanding its agreement that
a professional can be held liable to third parties in negligence, the court refused to permit
any such liability in the case at bar:
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Prima Facie Tort
The prima facie tort doctrine,73 which has experienced its great-
est development in New York,7 originated in England late in the
nineteenth century 75 and gradually has been incorporated into
American law78 as a residuary cause of action. Apparently, the pri-
mary purpose of the doctrine is to provide remedies for intentional
wrongs that do not fall within any of the traditional tort categories. 7
The principle stated in the leading prima facie tort case has sur-
vived to the present largely unchanged:
[I]ntentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary
course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage an-
other in that person's property or trade, is actionable if done with-
out just cause or excuse.78
It may be said that a driver relies on other drivers being reasonably fit to drive.
Where a doctor knows his patient is not reasonably fit to drive he has a duty to
patient as well as the driving public to reasonably warn his patient. There is no
analogous duty flowing between attorneys and opposing parties.
447 F. Supp. at 1382 (citation omitted). See also note 100 infra.
Another theory upon which the plaintiff sought recovery was breach of the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility (the Code). The plaintiff maintained the Code's rules are tanta-
mount "to drivers [sic] rules of the road which if violated constitute negligence per se." 447
F. Supp. at 1383. The court refused to recognize a cause of action based upon the Code. For
a more complete discussion of the Code, see notes 116-125 and accompanying text infra.
The final bases upon which recovery was sought were conspiracy and "[r]eckless and
[h]eedless [d]isregard of [d]efendant's [flights." 447 F. Supp. at 1384. These claims were
rejected with minimal discussion. Id. On appeal, the district court's ruling was affirmed
without opinion. 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978) (mem.).
" See Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1051-66; Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of
the Prima Facie Tort Principle, 54 Nw. U. L. REv. 563 (1959); Forkosch, An Analysis of the
"Prima Facie Tort" Cause of Action, 42 CoRNELL L.Q. 465 (1957); Hale, Prima Facie Torts,
Combination, and Non-Feasance, 46 COLUM. L. Rev. 196 (1946); Halpern, Intentional Torts
and the Restatement, 7 BuFF o L. Rev. 7 (1957); Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8
H!Av. L. REv. 1 (1894); Seavey, Bad Motive Plus Harm Equals a Tort, 26 ST. JoHN's L. REv.
279 (1952); Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 52 COLUM. L. Rev. 503 (1952); Note,
Abstaining from Willful Injury - The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 10 SYRAcUsE L. Rev. 53
(1958).
74 Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1054; Forkosch, supra note 73, at 475.
11 It appears that the earliest case in which a court stated the elements of prima facie
tort was Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co., [1889] 23 Q.B.D. 598 (C.A.), affl'd,
[1892] A.C. 25 (1891).
71 One commentator has attributed the emergence of the prima facie tort doctrine in the
United States to Mr. Justice Holmes. Brown, supra note 73, at 564. While on the bench of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (and later as a Justice on the United States
Supreme Court, see note 78 and accompanying text infra), Holmes stated the basic principles
of the doctrine. See Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 487, 59 N.E. 125, 126 (1901); Plant v.
Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 504, 57 N.E. 1011, 1016 (1900) (dissenting opinion); Vegelahn v.
Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 105-06, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1896) (dissenting opinion).
7 See, e.g., Knapp Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d
170, 172, 148 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (1st Dep't 1956); Forkosch, supra note 73, at 475-76.
,1 Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co., [1889] 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613 (C.A.) (per
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While this statement accurately reflects the essence of prima
facie tort, the doctrine's utility has been restricted by the imposition
of two requirements. The plaintiff must prove special damages 7 and
that the defendant's conduct was malicious. 0 Some courts have
construed the malice requirement so strictly as to reject a claim if
the defendant had any motive for committing the act other than
that of injuring the plaintiff 1 It would appear that adherence to
this rule effectively would bar actions against attorneys for institut-
ing baseless suits, because such lawsuits are brought primarily to
enrich those bringing them and not maliciously to injure the indi-
viduals against whom they are brought.
The residuary nature of the prima facie tort doctrine has led
courts to limit its application to wrongs that lie outside the purview
of the traditional torts. 2 Consistent with this policy, it has been held
that the theory cannot be employed to circumvent the stricter re-
quirements of traditional torts in factual settings to which they
Bowen, L.J.) (citation omitted), affl'd, [1892] A.C. 25 (1891). The prima facie tort doctrine
received major recognition in the United States in a Supreme Court opinion authored by Mr.
Justice Holmes: "[P]rima facie, the intentional infliction of temporal damage is a cause of
action, which, as a matter of substantive law, whatever may be the form of pleading, requires
a justification if the defendant is to escape." Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904);
accord, Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946).
While the principle stated in Mogul apparently was intended to embrace all intentional
misconduct, see Brown, supra note 73, at 563, prima facie tort has developed into a discrete
cause of action with its own set of proof requirements. Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1053. For
a discussion of the historical evolution of prima facie tort, see Forkosch, supra note 73.
More recently, prima facie tort has been defined as "the intentional malicious injury to
another by otherwise lawful means without economic or social justification, but solely to harm
the other . . . ." Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 284, 287, 266
N.Y.S.2d 406, 409 (1st Dep't 1965) (citation omitted), modified & affl'd, 19 N.Y.2d 453, 227
N.E.2d 572, 280 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1967); accord, Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 769, 146
N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (1st Dep't 1955).
11 See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Levitt, 52 App. Div. 2d 493, 498, 384 N.Y.S.2d 804,
808 (1st Dep't 1976); Frawley Chem. Corp. v. A.P. Larson Co., 274 App. Div. 643, 645, 86
N.Y.S.2d 710, 713 (1st Dep't 1949). But see Grattan v. Societa Per Azzioni Cotonificio Can-
toni, 137 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954), affl'd, 285 App. Div. 1042, 140
N.Y.S.2d 154 (1st Dep't 1955).
11 See, e.g., Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 769, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (1st Dep't 1955).
As the Ruza court stated, prima facie tort may be "invoked when the intention merely to
commit the act, is present, has motivated the action, and has caused injury to [the] plaintiff
... ." Id.; see Benton v. Kennedy-Van Saun Mfg. & Eng'r Corp., 2 App. Div. 2d 27, 28,
152 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957 (1st Dep't 1956); Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1053; Forkosch, supra
note 73, at 481.
81 E.g., Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney, 308 N.Y. 164, 169, 124 N.E.2d 104, 106 (1954). See also
Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 90, 140 N.E. 203, 206 (1923); Benton v. Kennedy-Van Saun
Mfg. & Eng'r Corp., 2 App. Div. 2d 27, 29, 152 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957-58 (1st Dep't 1956).
82 Forkosch, supra note 73, at 481; Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 52 COLUM. L.
Rsv. 503, 505 (1952).
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apply.8 Thus, the prima facie tort doctrine has failed to provide an
easier route to recovery in cases that are not redressable in malicious
prosecution. This failure was demonstrated in Drago v.
Buonagurio, recently decided by the New York Court of Appeals.
In Drago, a physician brought an action against the attorney of
a person who had sued him in a medical malpractice action. Al-
though the plaintiff in the malpractice action had alleged that the
physician negligently caused the death of her husband,'8 the physi-
cian maintained that he had never treated the decedent during the
period of illness leading to his death.8 Contending that the attor-
ney's actions were "malicious, unethical and grossly negligent," the
physician sought relief for having "suffered much mental anguish,
defamation of character and [for] otherwise [having been] dam-
aged.""7 The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state
a cause of action.8 On appeal, the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court reversed, holding that the complaint neverthe-
less stated a valid claim in prima facie tort.89 The court observed
that "[tlhe fact that a cause of action is new, novel or nameless
should not deprive an injured person of a remedy."9 Noting the
general expansion in the use of the prima facie tort doctrine in New
York,"1 the court found that "a clear intentional wrong, causing
"E.g., Knapp Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 170,
172, 148 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (1st Dep't 1956); Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 769, 146
N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (1st Dep't 1955).
8, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978), rev'g 61 App. Div. 2d 282,
402 N.Y.S.2d 250 (3d Dep't), discussed in The Survey, 52 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 620, 675 (1978).
5 61 App. Div. 2d at 284, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
" Id. The gravamen of the physician's complaint was that he had been named in the
earlier action "indiscriminately and as a discovery device in order to ascertain where responsi-
bility could be placed . Id.
87 Id.
89 Misc. 2d 171, 173, 391 N.Y.S.2d 61, 62 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1977). The
court found an abuse of process claim inapplicable to the facts of the case, because "[t]he
gist of the action . . . lies in the improper use of process after it is issued, and not for its
issuance .... Id. (citation omitted). A malicious prosecution claim was denied for failure
to allege "interference with plaintiff's person or property" or "that the malpractice action was
terminated" in his favor. Id. Prima facie tort was held not to lie "in the absence of any
allegation of actual or special damages .... " Id. Finally, the court determined that an
attorney should not be held liable to third parties in negligence, since it "would operate to
discourage free resort to the courts for the resolution of controversies, contrary to public policy
.... " Id., 391 N.Y.S.2d at 63 (citation omitted).
1, 61 App. Div. 2d 282, 286-87, 402 N.Y.S.2d 250, 253 (3d Dep't 1978). The intermediate
appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the abuse of process, malicious prosecution and
negligence claims for the same reasons as those offered in the opinion of the trial court. Id.
at 285, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 251-52.
Id. at 286, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
Id. (citing Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397,
343 N.E.2d 278, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975)). For a discussion of Farmingdale, see note 98 infra.
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apparent and foreseeable harm. . . , without just excuse or justifi-
cation, [had] been alleged" and concluded that the physician had
stated a cause of action.92
The New York Court of Appeals unanimously reversed,,3 noting
that "a 'new, novel or nameless' cause of action" would have to be
recognized in order to hold the attorney liable. 4 The court refused
to grant such recognition, exercising what it termed "judicial re-
straint." 5 It would appear that the Court of Appeals' reversal was
prompted by the intermediate appellate court's departure from es-
tablished interpretation of the doctrine. The appellate division did
not require the plaintiff to allege special damages, a well-settled
prerequisite to maintaining a prima facie tort action in New York,96
nor did it require proof that the infliction of injury was the defen-
dant's sole reason for bringing the malpractice action. 7 In addition,
the appellate division's interpretation permitted the physician to
circumvent the more onerous requirements of traditional torts."
92 61 App. Div. 2d at 286, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
93 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978).
" Id. at 780, 386 N.E.2d at 822, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
"Id.
9 See, e.g., ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 454, 458, 368 N.E.2d 1230, 1232,
398 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866 (1977); Loudin v. Mohawk Airlines, Inc., 24 App. Div. 2d 447, 260
N.Y.S.2d 899 (1st Dep't 1965); Potash v. Sacks, 282 App. Div. 962, 125 N.Y.S.2d 787 (2d
Dep't 1953).
'7 See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
" See note 82 and accompanying text supra. In New York, an individual must prove
interference with person or property in order to recover in malicious prosecution. See, e.g.,
Chappelle v. Gross, 26 App. Div. 2d 340, 274 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1st Dep't 1966); Metromedia,
Inc. v. Mandel, 21 App. Div. 2d 219, 223, 249 N.Y.S.2d 806, 810 (1st Dep't), affl'd, 15 N.Y.2d
616, 203 N.E.2d 914, 255 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1964). Since recovery in prima facie tort is allowed
upon proof of only special damages, see note 79 supra, the doctrine would provide an easier
route to redress frivolous litigation if it could be employed in factual settings to which
malicious prosecution applied. To permit an individual to rely upon prima facie tort in such
a case, however, would violate the policy of reserving this tort for use as a residuary cause of
action. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
It should be noted that the New York Court of Appeals extended the reach of prima facie
tort in a case prior to Drago. See Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n,
38 N.Y.2d 397, 343 N.E.2d 278, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975). In Farmingdale, the Court of
Appeals sustained a complaint based on the theories of abuse of process and prima facie tort,
noting that "whenever there is an intentional infliction of economic damage, without excuse
or justification, we will eschew formalism and recognize the existence of a cause of action."
Id. at 406, 343 N.E.2d at 284, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 644. This ruling has prompted one commenta-
tor to suggest that prima facie tort may provide a means of bypassing the rigid injury require-
ments imposed by New York courts upon plaintiffs in malicious prosecution actions. See
Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1061-62. While the Farmingdale holding clearly broadened the
range of cases to which prima facie tort may be applied by permitting reliance upon alterna-
tive legal theories, the court did not suggest that the theory might be used in the future to
avoid the strict proof requirements of other tort theories. It is submitted that to extrapolate
1979]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:775
The preceding review suggests that malicious prosecution is the
most appropriate theory for individuals seeking redress from their
adversaries' attorneys to rely upon, although abuse of process con-
ceivably may lie in certain circumstances.9 In contrast, the prima
facie tort doctrine, properly applied, can be of little vralue to a plain-
tiff, because its requirements should be no less stringent than those
of malicious prosecution.'
a rule from Farmingdale that would make prima facie tort available to a plaintiff whenever
traditional torts failed on their pleadings would tend to consolidate all intentional torts into
one universal theory by encouraging the use of prima facie tort. While the prima facie tort
doctrine may have been intended to be a universal principle rather than a discrete tort, it
has not been so applied. See note 78 supra.
There have been cases in which courts have permitted reliance upon prima facie tort
notwithstanding the failure of applicable traditional tort theories. See Munson Line, Inc. v.
Green, 6 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), appeal dismissed per curiam, 165 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1948);
Gillis v. Georgas, 225 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962). In Munson, the court
allowed a prima facie tort claim despite the insufficiency of a malicious prosecution claim,
although the court cautioned that the prima facie tort claim would be dismissed if it turned
out to be "nothing more than a glorified cause of action for malicious prosecution .... " 6
F.R.D. at 18. Interestingly, the Munson court also was faced with a contention that violation
of a criminal conspiracy statute should be redressable in a civil action. The court refused to
recognize such a cause of action, however, for reasons that appear to militate with equal force
against attempts to rely upon prima facie tort in order to escape the procedural burdens of
other torts:
[I]t would permit suits for conduct in the nature of malicious prosecution, yet
lacking the essential requisites for basing such an action, and thus would approve
the bringing and maintaining of an action for malicious prosecution based on facts
which under the settled policy of the State could not otherwise be instituted and
maintained.
Id. at 19.
" See Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1040 & nn.250-51; note 64 supra.
110 Claims brought against attorneys for instituting frivolous lawsuits on theories other
than malicious prosecution, abuse of process and prima facie tort also have been generally
unsuccessful. For example, defamation actions have failed because an absolute privilege
is accorded in nearly all jurisdictions to statements made during judicial proceedings by
parties, see, e.g., Ginsburg v. Black, 192 F.2d 823, 824 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
934 (1952); Carpenter v. Ashley, 148 Cal. 422, 424-25, 83 P. 444, 445 (1906); McDavitt v.
Boyer, 169 Ill. 475, 482-85, 48 N.E. 317, 319-20 (1897), and their counsel, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRs § 586 (1977); R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 11, § 50; W. PROSSER,
supra note 1, § 114; Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1042-48. See generally 1 A. HANSON, LmIEL
AND RELATED TORTS 108-114 (1969); Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial
Proceedings, 9 COLUM. L. REv. 463, 600 (1909). At least one jurisdiction, however, recognizes
only a qualified privilege, see Foster v. McClain, 251 So. 2d 179 (La. App. 1971), which
protects comments that are "material [and made] with probable cause and without malice,"
Waldo v. Morrison, 220 La. 1006, 1011, 58 So. 2d 210, 211 (1952). The privilege that attaches
to statements made in judicial proceedings, whether absolute or qualified, arises from the
public policy favoring free access to the courts. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 114, at 778.
See generally Veeder, supra, at 474-83. This privilege has been offered by way of analogy as
an argument against creating new remedies for third parties against attorneys. See Lyddon
v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 822, 372 N.E.2d 685, 690 (1978). The tort of invasion of privacy
likewise has failed to prove successful against attorneys by third parties. See Wolfe v. Arroyo,
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Recent case law indicates that attorneys appear to be insulated
from civil liability to their clients' adversaries. Claims have been
dismissed at the pleading stage for failure to satisfy strict proof
requirements, the most controversial of which relates to injury.'0'
Regardless of the theory relied upon, it is clear that any attempt at
redress for injuries sustained within the judicial process must over-
543 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 117; Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383 (1960). It appears that privacy claims are hindered by the same
considerations as are defamation claims. See Wolfe v. Arroyo, 543 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. Civ. App.
1976).
Another theory invoked by persons seeking redress against adversaries' attorneys is the
intentional infliction of emotional distress, defined in the Second Restatement of Torts as
follows:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional dis-
tress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). The strict requirements for establishing
liability under this theory thus far have rendered it unsuccessful as against attorneys. See
Joseph v. Markovitz, 27 Ariz. App. 122, 551 P.2d 571 (1976). See generally R. MALLEN &
V. Lavrr, supra note 11, § 51.
Claims brought against attorneys by third parties based upon negligence also have failed.
See, e.g., Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 919-21, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 238-40 (1975);
Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596, 600-02 (La. App. 1976), cert. denied, 340 So. 2d 990
(1977). Although the range of individuals other than clients to whom a lawyer owes a duty of
care has been expanded, see Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1969) (en banc); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 589, 364 P.2d 685, 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821,
824 (1961) (en banc), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962), this duty has not been extended to a
client's adversary. See, e.g., Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 919-21, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237,
238-40 (1975). As the court stated in Berlin v. Nathan, 64 I1. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367
(1978), a plaintiff's attorney "has but one intended beneficiary, his client." Id. at 952, 381
N.E.2d at 1376. For a discussion of attorneys' liability to third parties in negligence, see R.
MALLEN & V. Lavrr, supra note 11, §§ 53-59.
Many plaintiffs who have been denied recovery under recognized causes of action have
contended that they have a constitutional right to a remedy, see, e.g., Lyddon v. Shaw, 56
ill. App. 3d 815, 822, 372 N.E.2d 685, 690-91 (1978), which is grounded in state constitutional
provisions such as the following:
Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs
which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain
justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly.
ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (emphasis added); accord, e.g., ALA. CONsT. art. 1, § 13; FLA. CONST.
art. 1, § 21; MD. CONST. D.R., art. 19; MAsS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XI; MiNN. CONST. art. 1, § 8;
N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 22; R.I. CONsT. art. 1, § 5; Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 9. See also CONN. CONSr.
art. 1, § 12; DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 9; N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 18; PA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 11; S.C.
CONST. art. 1, § 19; TFx. CONST. art. 1, § 13. These claims have proved unsuccessful, because,
as stated in Pantone v. Demos, 59 l. App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978), the constitutional
provisions are "'expression[s] of a philosophy and not . . . mandate[s] that a 'certain
remedy' be provided in any specific form or that the nature of the proof necessary to the
award of a judgment or decree continue without modification.'" Id. at 332, 375 N.E.2d at
483 (quoting Sullivan v. Midlothian Park Dist., 51 Ill. 2d 274, 277, 281 N.E.2d 659, 662
(1972)).
M See notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra.
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come the strong public policy favoring free access to the courts.'0 2 It
would appear, therefore, that the rigid proof requirements are de-
signed to eliminate all claims except those involving the most egre-
gious misconduct. These considerations inevitably raise the ques-
tion whether an attorney ever should be held civilly liable to an
adversary for his conduct as a trial advocate.
ATTORNEY'S LIABILTY: COMPETING CONSIDERATIONS
Factors Militating Against Liability
The relationship of a client to his attorney is governed by prin-
ciples of agency,'13 which mandate that an attorney be loyal,' 4 re-
main within the boundaries of his authority,"5 obey his client's in-
structions,'0 ' exercise due care'07 and account for all money and
property entrusted to him.0 8 An attorney also must disclose any
interests he has or acquires that may be adverse to those of his
client.'' In addition, communications between the client and attor-
'11 See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1380 (N.D. Iowa), aff'd mem., 590 F.2d
341 (8th Cir. 1978); Rodgers v. W.T. Grant Co., 326 So. 2d 57, 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975),
rev'd & remanded on other grounds, 341 So. 2d 511 (1976); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d
940, 951, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1375 (1978); Lee v. Southland Corp., 244 S.E.2d 756, 758 (Va.
1978). See also Brickman, Of Arterial Passageways Through the Legal Process: The Right of
Universal Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 595 (1973). Many state
constitutions guarantee open courts. See note 100 supra.
10 2 F. MECHEM, A TREATSE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 2158 (2d ed. 1914). For a discussion
of standard agency rules, see 1 F. MECHEM, supra, §§ 1188-1353.
' See, e.g., Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U.S. 494, 500 (1879); Littleton v. Kincaid, 179 F.2d
848, 857 (4th Cir. 1950); Littell v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 411, 425 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd mem.,
519 F.2d 1399 (4th Cir. 1975). See generally 1 F. MECHEM, supra note 103, §§ 1188-1239, 2190.
' See, e.g., Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 663, 320 P.2d 140, 148
(1958); Coopwood v. Baldwin, 25 Miss. 129, 131 (1852). See generally 1 F. MECHEM, supra
note 103, §§ 1240-1243, 2206.
"' See, e.g., Shelly v. Hansen, 244 Cal. App. 2d 210, 215, 53 Cal. Rptr. 20, 23 (1966),
overruled on other grounds, Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176,
190 n.29, 491 P.2d 421, 430 n.29, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 846 n.29 (1971) (en banc); Fleener v.
Fleener, 133 Ill. App. 118, 122, 263 N.E.2d 879, 882 (1970). See generally 1 F. MECHEM, supra
note 103, §§ 1244-1273, 2206.
I" See, e.g., National Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 198 (1879); Palmer v. Nissen,
256 F. Supp. 497, 501 (S.D. Me. 1966); Sarti v. Udall, 91 Ariz. 24, 26, 369 P.2d 92, 93 (1962)
(en banc); Wilson v. Russ, 20 Me. 421, 424 (1841); American Hemisphere Marine Agencies,
Inc. v. Kreis, 40 Misc. 2d 1090, 1092, 244 N.Y.S.2d 602, 604 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963).
See generally R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 11, § 72; 1 F. MECHEM, supra note 103, §§
1274-1326; 2 F. MECHEM, supra note 103, §§ 2192-2205.
'" See, e.g., Kukla v. Perry, 361 Mich. 311, 326, 105 N.W.2d 176, 183-84 (1960); In re
Kennedy, 80 Wash. 2d 222, 228-29, 492 P.2d 1364, 1367 (1972) (en banc); ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102 [hereinafter cited as CODE]. See generally 1 F.
MECHEM, supra note 103, §§ 1327-1352; 2 F. MECHEM, supra note 103, § 2207.
102 See, e.g., Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 525, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 597
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ney must be kept confidential pursuant to the attorney-client privi-
lege.110 Since the attorney generally has control over the procedural
aspects of a lawsuit,' the client must place great reliance upon his
legal expertise. It is essential, therefore, that the client feel free to
disclose all relevant information to his attorney.'12 When an attor-
ney's belief in the merit of a case is based upon incomplete or false
information obtained from his client,1 the attorney should not be
held liable for bringing the action, because he will lack knowledge
sufficient to entertain malicious motives, and his client's acts may
not be imputed to him.' Agency theory therefore appears to shield
the attorney from liability in the overwhelming majority of cases,
leaving open the possibility of liability only where he assumes an
active role in wrongful conduct."5
Relevant ethical considerations similarly militate against the
imposition of liability upon attorneys for instituting groundless suits
(1966); Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Comstock, 327 A.2d 891, 904-05 (Md. App. 1974); Schroeder
v. Schaefer, 477 P.2d 720, 723 (Or. 1970), modified on other grounds on rehearing en banc,
258 Or. 444, 483 P.2d 818 (1971); R. MALLEN & V. LEvrT, supra note 11, §§ 95-96; 2 F. MECHEM,
supra note 103, § 2189.
,"I See, e.g., Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 455 F.2d 337, 341-42 (5th Cir. 1972)
(quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENcE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)); State Highway Dep't
v. 62. 96247 Acres of Land, More or Less, 193 A.2d 799, 812 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963); Taylor v.
Sheldon, 173 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Ohio St. 1961); CODE, supra note 108, Canon 4. See generally
R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 11, § 94; 2 F. MECHEM, supra note 103, §§ 2297-2313; 8 J.
WiGMoRE, EvinENcE §§ 2290-2329 (3d ed. 1940).
"I See CODE, supra note 108, EC 7-7; 2 F. MECHEM, supra note 103, § 2160. For a general
discussion of the role of both the attorney and client in conducting a lawsuit, see D. RosEN-
THAL, LAwYER AND CLENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 7-28 (1974).
"'2 See, e.g., State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 415-16, 129 A.2d 417, 425 (1957); State
Highway Comm'n v. Earl, 82 S.D. 139, 147, 143 N.W.2d 88, 92 (1966); CODE, supra note 108,
EC 4-1; M. FaEEDN, LAwYERs' ETmcs N AN ADvERsARY SYsTEM 5 (1975); 2 F. MECHEM, supra
note 103, § 2297.
,"I As an agent, an attorney has no duty to perform wrongful acts, even if instructed to
do so. 1 F. MECHEM, supra note 103, § 1260; W. SEA EY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF AGENCY
§ 157 (1964). Similarly, the Code of Professional Responsibility permits a lawyer "to seek
any lawful objective." CODE, supra note 108, EC 7-1. In this regard, it has been suggested
that the institution of a lawsuit is itself wrongful only in rare circumstances. See J. LmBER-
MAN, CRIsis AT THE BAR 161-63 (1978).
"I See City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Sewell, 300 Ill. App. 582, 588-89, 21 N.E.2d 810,
813 (1939); cf. note 144 and accompanying text infra (attorney has right to rely on assertions
of client). See generally 2 F. MECHEM, supra note 103, § 2219. An agent's acts performed
within the scope of his employment are imputable to his principal. E.g., William B. Tanner
Co. v. Wioo, Inc., 528 F.2d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 1975); Ray E. Loper Lumber Co. v. Windham,
291 Ala. 428, 432, 282 So. 2d 256, 260 (1973); Walker v. Fontenot, 329 So. 2d 762, 764 (La.
App.), cert. denied, 332 So.2d 217 (1976).
"I5 See notes 141-155 and accompanying text infra. See generally R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr,
supra note 11, §§ 41-59.
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in any but the most extreme cases."' One of the most basic prin-
ciples of the American legal system is that there should be unre-
strained access to the courts. An attorney's ethical duty in this re-
gard is found in the American Bar Association Code of Professional
Responsibility (the Code),' 7 which states that "[a] lawyer should
assist the legal profepsion in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel
available." ' The Code suggests that a lawyer carry out this man-
date by educating the public as to its legal rights, providing for
informed choice of counsel and helping generally to make the judi-
cial process accessible." 9 Of course, in drawing the Code, the Ameri-
can Bar Association did not intend for a lawyer to have unbridled
power to press his client's claim. Thus, while a lawyer is under a
duty to give his client zealous representation,' he must not "[f]ile
a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take
other action on behalf of his client when he knows or it is obvious
that such action would serve solely to harass or maliciously injure
another." 21
Although the Code clearly indicates when an attorney ethically
is prohibited from taking a particular action, the provisions govern-
ing withdrawal from representation are obscure. For example, while
a lawyer must withdraw where his client's obvious motivation in
bringing a suit is malicious,'22 an untenable claim, unsupported by
"good faith," merely permits an attorney to withdraw.',, The diffi-
"I See generally M. FREEDMAN, supra note 112; J. LmBERMAN, supra note 113, at 136-75;
R. MALLFN & V. LEvrr, supra note 11, § 117.
I The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, a replacement to the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, was adopted by the American Bar Association, effective January 1, 1970. For
an historical overview of the Code, see J. LBFRMAN, supra note 113, at 41-67; Wright, The
Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History and Objectives, 24 ARK. L. Rxv. 1 (1970). It
should be noted'that the Code has been criticized as ineffective in regulating lawyers' con-
duct. See J. LiEBERMAN, supra note 113, at 197-228.
, CODE, supra note 108, Canon 2.
, CODE, supra note 108, EC 2-1. While Canon 2 and Ethical Consideration 2-1 of the
Code encourage lawyers to make themselves and the legal system available, this encourage-
ment was mitigated in the original draft of the Code by several Ethical Considerations
and Disciplinary Rules that restricted a lawyer's right to advertise. These prohibitions were
challenged successfully before the Supreme Court in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977),
wherein the Court held that bans against advertising of routine legal services violate the first
amendment. Id. at 384. Following Bates, the American Bar Association revised the Ethical
Considerations and Disciplinary Rules governing advertising. See ABA HousE OF DELEGATES,
AMENDMENTS TO CANON 2 OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBMTY (adopted Aug. 10,
1977). For a discussion of the advertising issue, see M. FREEDMAN, supra note 112, at 113-25.
12 CODE, supra note 108, Canon 7, DR 7-101; see id., EC 7-1.
12, Id., DR 7-102(A)(1).
in Id., DR 2-110(B)(1); see note 153 and accompanying text infra.
in Id., DR 2-110(C)(1); see note 153 and accompanying text infra.
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culty in distinguishing a wholly frivolous claim from one that is
unwarranted under the law and not defensible by good faith is exac-
erbated by the requirement that a lawyer resolve doubtful matters
in his client's favor. 24 Accordingly, a lawyer is given great freedom
of movement within the judicial system, since his ethical duty is not
breached unless he represents a client with a claim that is unques-
tionably devoid of merit. It is submitted that this ethical duty logi-
cally must set a minimum level of culpability needed to be shown
for tort liability to be imposed upon an attorney. While the drafters
of the Code purported not to define criteria for imposing civil liabil-
ity,12s it would seem unreasonable to hold an attorney liable where
he has acted within the parameters of the Code.
The adversary trial system followed in common law countries'2
has a significant impact on the range of conduct in which an attor-
ney permissibly may engage. The theory underlying this system is
that the presentation of each side of an issue by conflicting parties
is most likely to uncover the truth.'2 This goal may be realized only
if both parties and their advocates are able to state their positions
freely and forcefully. Although this sometimes may make overzeal-
ous advocacy difficult to avoid, 121 it is submitted that levying penal-
ties for any but the most flagrant abuses would create the risk that
attorneys would argue their clients' positions with less force than is
'2 See id., EC 7-3. While "serving a client as adviser, a lawyer in appropriate circum-
stances should give his professional opinion as to what the ultimate decisions of the courts
would likely be as to the applicable law." Id. The difficulties involved in determining what
constitutes a "frivolous" claim are discussed in J. LmBERMAN, supra note 113, at 161-63.
,25 See CODE, supra note 108, Preliminary Statement.
62 See G. HAZARD, ETmcs IN THE PRATCE OF LAw 120-35 (1978).
'" Adversary adjudication as a theoretical means of finding the truth has been explained
in terms of "two linked components":
One is that party presentation will result in the best presentation, because each
party is propelled into maximum effort in investigation and presentation by the
prospect of victory; in contrast, a judge-interrogator is only interested in getting
through the day and through his caseload. The other component of the theory is
more complex and has to do with the psychology of decision making. It runs essen-
tially as follows: Proof through evidence requires hypothesis; hypothesis requires a
preliminary mind-set; if an active judge-interrogator develops the proof, his prelim-
inary mind-set too easily can become his final decision; therefore, it is better to have
conflicting preliminary hypotheses and supporting proofs presented by the parties
so that the judge's mind can be kept open until all the evidence is at hand.
Id. at 121.
'I' See J. LBEmsAN, supra note 113. Lieberman states that "[b]ecause Americans
believe so deeply in the unexamined maxim 'Every person is entitled to his day in court,'
the prohibition against provoking or prolonging baseless claims is frequently violated. Most
lawyers see their jobs as picking nits on behalf of clients." Id. at 161.
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needed in our system.' 29
The expansion of tort liability in general, which serves to en-
courage litigation, also militates against the imposition of liability
on attorneys who institute baseless lawsuits. 3 ' Since persons seek-
ing novel interpretations of law face equivocal results, it would ap-
pear that uncertain claims must arise frequently in a legal system
that constantly recognizes new causes of action. Although an attor-
ney is encouraged to resolve uncertainties in his client's favor,'3 ' he
would be hesitant to do so if too readily found liable in tort. Para-
doxically, therefore, it appears that the expansion of tort liability
requires the restriction of an attorney's liability.
Factors Militating in Favor of Liability
While many considerations suggest that attorneys should be
immune from civil liability to their clients' adversaries, strong argu-
ments also exist favoring the imposition of liability for certain types
of conduct. For example, an attorney's own actions constitute a
In As stated by the court in Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n,
38 N.Y.2d 397, 343 N.E.2d 278, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975), "our adversarial system cannot
function without zealous advocacy." Id. at 404, 343 N.E.2d at 283, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
'3 An interesting example of the courts' apparent encouragement of individuals to pur-
sue legal remedies for alleged wrongs may be seen in the expansion of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, which greatly has enhanced an attorney's ability to name defendants. Res ipsa
loquitur, frequently used in medical malpractice cases, is particularly pertinent to an exami-
nation of attorneys' liability, because most countersuits against attorneys follow unsuccessful
medical malpractice suits. See authorities cited in note 135 infra. The doctrine may be
described as follows:
[W]here the instrumentality which produced an injury is within the exclusive
possession and control of the person charged with negligence, and such person has
exclusive knowledge of the care exercised in the control and management of that
instrumentality, evidence of circumstances which show that the accident would not
ordinarily have occurred without neglect of some duty owed to the plaintiff is
sufficient to justify an inference of negligence and to shift the burden of explanation
to the defendant.
Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 234, 196 N.E. 36, 38 (1935) (citation omitted). See also 1
S. SPEISER, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: REs IPSA LoQurruR § 2:1 (1972). In some jurisdictions, a
plaintiff is not required to show that the defendant had exclusive control of the instrumental-
ity at the time of injury. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944)
(en banc). See generally 2 S. SPEISER, supra, §§ 22:1-:25. In Ybarra, the plaintiff was permit-
ted to proceed under the res ipsa loquitur theory against all of the hospital personnel who
had control of his body for injuries sustained while he was unconscious. 25 Cal. 2d at 493-94,
154 P.2d at 691. Such an expansion of the range of individuals to whom a tort applies
necessarily increases the number of claims that are neither clearly tenable nor untenable and
must be regarded as encouraging their prosecution.
" See CODE, supra note 108, EC 7-3. For a pre-Code view of ethical restrictions upon a
lawyer as advocate, see Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TEX. L. REv. 575
(1961).
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misuse of the judicial process when he knowingly serves as his
client's vehicle for unjustly suing another. 32 A fear of personal liabil-
ity might deter an attorney from taking such a case.
Another situation where a lawyer should be held civilly liable
is the case where he advises his client, who is ignorant as to the legal
merit of his claim, that he has a valid cause of action, when in fact
the lawyer knows that he does not. While the law of agency normally
imputes the acts of an attorney to his client, 133 the client has a
defense if he can demonstrate that, in instituting the lawsuit, he
acted in good faith reliance upon his lawyer's advice.'34 Thus, if an
attorney were absolutely immune from liability, the individual sub-
jected to a frivolous suit would be denied redress. Additionally, this
freedom would encourage lawyers to recommend that their clients
sue whenever any possibility of an out-of-court settlement existed."35
The impact of frivolous litigation on those who are subjected to
it militates strongly in favor of imposing tort liability upon attor-
neys who encourage it. Not only must much time and money be
invested to defend a lawsuit, the fear of harm to one's reputation
also may be extreme, particularly in a suit alleging substandard
professional performance. 31 While such injuries do not constitute
interference with person or property or any other special injury, 137
they must seem no less severe to those who sustain them and may
In An instance in which an attorney "knowingly serve[d] as his client's vehicle for
unjustly suing another" might arise, for example, in a lawsuit in which both the attorney and
client, while fully aware that the client's claim lacked merit, sued the adversary in the hope
of obtaining an out-of-court settlement. See Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1018.
13 See 2 F. MECHEM, supra note 103, § 2227. See also note 114 supra.
134 The good faith reliance upon counsel defense is available where the advice relied upon
"is based upon a full and fair statement of the facts by the client. . . ." Masterson v. Pig'n
Whistle Corp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 323, 339, 326 P.2d 918, 929 (1958); accord, Liberty Loan Corp.
v. Williams, 201 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 1972); Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super.
139, 172, 83 A.2d 246, 262 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 9 N.J. 605, 89 A.2d 242 (1952). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 675(b) (1977).
"3 Since most countersuits against attorneys are instituted by physicians claiming to
have been sued groundlessly for malpractice, see, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F Supp. 1376
(N.D. Iowa), aff'd mem., 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978); Pantone v. Demos, 59 Ill. App. 3d 328,
375 N.E.2d 480 (1978); Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d
910 (1978), it seems that wrongful litigation is particularly likely to occur where a judgment
or settlement is to be satisfied by an insurance carrier, see Note, Rx for New York's Medical
Malpractice Crisis, 11 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 467, 480 (1975).
I"' See Daughtry, The View of the Medical Profession, 38 INs. COUNSEL J. 534, 535 (1971);
Note, Rx for New York's Medical Malpractice Crisis, 11 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROS. 467, 476-
77 (1975). It should be noted that there is some indication that physicians' reputations have
not been damaged by malpractice actions. See id. at 477 n.63.
"I See notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra.
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be much longer in duration. '
A final factor suggesting that attorneys should not be abso-
lutely immune from liability to persons other than their clients is
the effect that groundless litigation has on the legal system itself.
Surely the legal system will not be held in high regard by the public
if it is not perceived as offering a forum for redress of genuine
wrongs. From a practical standpoint, moreover, each unjustifiable
lawsuit that goes before a court delays the adjudication of a merito-
rious claim. '
Despite the benefits potentially to be reaped by the legal sys-
tem and individuals unjustly sued if attorneys are held liable in tort,
countervailing policy considerations suggest that the more impor-
tant objective is to ensure open access to the courts. 140 It is submit-
ted, therefore, that an individual who is subjected to a frivolous
lawsuit should have a right of action against his adversary's attor-
ney, but this right should be restricted to situations where the attor-
ney's misconduct is clearly egregious. In order for such misconduct
to be redressed, however, it is necessary to employ a test that relia-
bly will identify it.
ATTORNEY'S LiArnLrrY: A PROPOSED STANDARD
While there has been a recent surge in malicious prosecution
suits against attorneys,' successful actions date back to the nine-
teenth century.'42 The early courts ruled, however, that an attorney
could be held personally liable to his client's adversary only where
he knew there was an absence of probable cause and that his client
was "actuated by illegal or malicious motives. . ... " The require-
' In the case of the medical profession, increased litigation has resulted in higher insur-
ance premiums, which some physicians cannot afford to pay. See Daughtry, supra note 136,
at 534. The degree to which the advent of liability insurance has benefited the public is
questionable, since its costs have been passed on to patients in the form of higher fees. See
Note, Rx for New York's Medical Malpractice Crisis, 11 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 467, 467
(1975). Moreover, some physicians have begun to practice "defensive medicine" to avoid
being sued, resulting in even higher fees to patients. Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1015.
"9 See Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1016.
110 The emphasis placed upon the judicial disfavor of the tort of malicious prosecution,
see note 41 supra, suggests that the interest in free access to the courts is paramount to that
of preventing frivolous litigation.
"I See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
112 See, e.g., Stockley v. Hornidge, 173 Eng. Rep. 377 (C.P. 1837).
4 Burnap v. Marsh, 13 Ill. 535, 538 (1852). Significantly, the Burnap court observed
"that in order to render the attorneys liable for suing out a writ . . . something more must
be shown than would be required were the action brought against the party in whose behalf
the writ was sued out." Id.
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ment of subjective knowledge was so strict that one court refused
to impose liability on an attorney for failing to exercise reasonable
care in determining the existence of probable cause before com-
mencing an action.'4 The current standard of liability in malicious
prosecution actions is far more relaxed than that employed in early
cases. For example, the probable cause requirement is fulfilled
where an attorney believes probable cause exists and this belief is
reasonable. Thus, if either the subjective or objective element is
missing, probable cause is deemed absent.' The modern malicious
prosecution action also differs from its earlier counterpart in that it
permits an inference of malice from a showing of a lack of probable
cause.'
It is submitted that the standards currently employed by
the courts to determine when to hold attorneys liable in malicious
prosecution have failed to provide definitive guidelines for attor-
neys. Rather than balancing an attorney's conduct against the pol-
icy favoring free access to judicial forums,"7 courts have sought to
safeguard freedom of access by imposing harsh injury requirements
that make recovery extremely difficult. Such requirements, most
notably the necessity of proving interference with person or prop-
erty, may bear very little relation to the essence of a plaintiff's claim
- that he has been sued without justification. If the purpose of
holding an attorney liable is to prevent abuses of the judicial sys-
tem, the action should focus on the attorney's conduct rather than
on an unduly strict injury requirement."'
In order for an attorney's liability to be more dependent upon
an attorney's acts than is the case at present, it is suggested that
an actual knowledge standard similar to that employed in early
1' See Peck v. Chouteau, 91 Mo. 138, 3 S.W. 577 (1887). The Peck court stated:
[TJhe attorney has the right to advise and act upon such information as the client
reveals to him. Nothing short of complete knowledge on the part of the attorney
that the action is groundless, and that the client is acting solely through illegal or
malicious motives, should make him liable in these actions.
Id. at 152, 3 S.W. at 581; accord, Maechtlen v. Clapp, 121 Kan. 777, 781-82, 250 P. 303, 304-
05 (1926); Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 240, 28 N.W.2d 780, 792 (1947) (quoting
Burnap v. Marsh, 13 Ill. 535, 538 (1852)).
M Tool Research & Eng'r Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 683, 120 Cal. Rptr.
291, 297 (1975).
"I See, e.g., National Sur. Co. v. Page, 58 F.2d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 1932); Bill Edwards
Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Carey, 244 S.E.2d 767, 773 (Va. 1978); W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 120,
at 855.
"' See note 41 supra.
The divergent approaches to the injury requirement in malicious prosecution actions
are discussed in notes 35-39 supra.
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malicious prosecution actions be adopted. "9 Moreover, the English
injury rule should be replaced by a rule wherein general damages
would suffice to establish a right to redress. Thus, an attorney who
has served as his client's vehicle for bringing a frivolous lawsuit
should be subjected to tort liability only if he knew that his client
was motivated by malice and knew that no probable cause existed
to believe in the validity of his client's claim. Where a client has
brought a lawsuit without malicious motives, erroneously believing
probable cause to exist, an attorney who advised it should be held
liable only if he knew that probable cause did not exist and was
himself actuated by malice or the desire for personal gain. In such
a case, the attorney has acted in his own behalf, effectively becom-
ing a party to the action. 51
A refusal to impose liability on an attorney except upon show-
ing subjective awareness would strike a balance between-the policy
favoring free access to the courts and that which places responsibil-
ity upon individuals for the proximate consequences of their tortious
acts. This standard also would comport with agency rules for the
imposition of liability, since no liability could be imposed unless an
attorney's part in a frivolous lawsuit were so great as to render him
"a party to his client's malice.' ' 51 In effect, the lawyer would be an
actor rather than a mere instrumentality."2 The proposed standard
is not inconsistent with the ethical guidelines set forth in the Code,
which require an attorney to withdraw from representing a client
only where "[h]e knows or it is obvious" that his client's purpose
in bringing suit is to cause malicious injury to the adversary. "' This
language reflects the intent of the American Bar Association to
allow an attorney considerable latitude within the judicial process,
"I See notes 143-44 and accompanying text supra.
110 A litigant is justified in bringing suit only to have the claim upon which it is based
properly adjudicated. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 676 (1977), quoted in text accompa-
nying note 24 supra. Thus, where a litigant "realizes that the adjudication will not be in his
favor unless the court or jury is misled in some way," he "is not seeking a proper adjudication
of the claim on which the civil proceeding is based." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 676,
Comment c. While the Restatement does not address specifically the liability of attorneys, it
is suggested that the comments relating to a litigant's liability provide support by analogy
for the view that an attorney who advises his client to pursue what he knows is a baseless
lawsuit should be subject to liability.
5, 2 F. MECHEM, supra note 103, § 2218. See also id., § 2219.
152 See 1 F. MECHEM, supra note 103, § 1462.
'5 CODE, supra note 108, DR 2-110(B)(1). The Code permits, but does not require, an
attorney to withdraw from representing a client who "[i]nsists upon presenting a claim or
defense that is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by good faith
argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." Id., DR 2-110(C)(1).
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even though his judgment may later prove to have been erroneous.
Under the liability standard that has been suggested, an attorney
would not be held liable in tort unless he exceeded the bounds of
ethical conduct. 154
The proposed test affords attorneys every reasonable doubt as
to the validity of questionable claims, since liability can be imposed
only where an attorney's involvement in a frivolous lawsuit is so
personal that he is elevated to the status of a party155 or is himself
the intentional tortfeasor. It is submitted that courts should adopt
a subjective standard rather than cling to the current objective test
of conduct, which relies upon onerous injury requirements to justify
denials of recovery.
CONCLUSION
In seeking compensation for damages sustained within the judi-
cial process, individuals increasingly have sought to impose tort
liability upon their adversaries' attorneys. Recovery has been pract-
ically impossible to obtain, however, due to the policy favoring free
access to the courts. This policy is embodied in traditional tort
theories, which provide relief only where rigid proof requirements
can be satisfied. ' Attempts to circumvent these requirements by
employing theories such as prima facie tort have met with failure,' 57
suggesting that courts are inclined to hold attorneys immune from
liability except for malpractice.'58
Under established theories of liability, countersuits very rarely
survive the pleading stage due to strict proof of injury requirements.
In contrast, a liability standard that eschews such obstacles and
instead examines the attorney's conduct would allow aggrieved per-
sons to present their claims to triers of fact. Although a rule requir-
ing an attorney to have subjective awareness of a lack of probable
cause and the malicious intent of his client obviously would con-
tinue to make redress against an adversary's attorney difficult to
obtain, it is submitted that this test more accurately would reflect
the genuine weakness of a particular claim than do current stan-
dards.
A policy of holding an attorney personally liable to his client's
1' See text accompanying note 125 supra.
11 See note 150 and accompanying text supra.
,56 See note 148 and accompanying text supra.
,' See Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978).
' See notes 101-102 and accompanying text supra.
1979]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:775
adversary for instituting a frivolous claim would run counter to the
policy favoring ready access to judicial forums. If these objectives
cannot be brought into optimal balance, it would appear best to err
on the side of freedom of access. It seems probable, therefore, that
lawyers for whom the prospect of personal gain justifies misconduct
will continue to engage in such misconduct unchecked.'59 In the end,
the integrity of the legal profession must depend upon the integrity
of its practitioners."' 0
John H. Beers
,M' Even though the prospects of holding an attorney liable to a client's adversary for
misconduct in a lawsuit may be slight, frivolous litigation nevertheless may be discouraged.
For example, a groundless suit possibly will give rise to a cause of action in malicious prosecu-
tion directly against the individual who brought it, even if, under the proposed standard, lack
of subjective awareness protects his attorney from liability. A party may escape liability only
where he can demonstrate that, in bringing the action, he relied in good faith upon the advice
of his lawyer. See note 135 and accompanying text supra. Some jurisdictions have provided
an additional remedy by enacting statutes that allow awards of attorney's fees in limited
situations. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 41 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); MD. R. PROC.
604(b); N.D. R. APP. PROC. 38. See generally S. SPEISER, ATroRN .Ys FFSs chs. 12-13 (1973 &
Supp. 1977). A recent amendment to the Illinois statute was described as "a new law relating
to medical malpractice." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 41, Commentary at 17 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1979). Frivolous lawsuits also may be discouraged by prosecution of attorneys for barratry in
states where it is recognized as an offense. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9901 (1973); id., §
26-2406 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 701 (1974); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-451 to 18.2-455 (1975).
Perhaps the greatest potential for regulating an attorney's conduct is offered by the ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility. While the Code has been attacked as ineffective, see J. LImER-
MAN, supra note 113, at 197-228, it is submitted that it must be enforced and, if necessary,
revised to fulfill its purpose.
- The authors of the Code apparently realized that an attorney's conduct is, as a practi-
cal matter, incapable of being regulated:
The Code of Professional Responsibility points the way to the aspiring and
provides standards by which to judge the transgressor. Each lawyer must find
within his own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which
his actions should rise above minimum standards. But in the last analysis it is the
desire for the respect and confidence of the members of his profession and of the
society which he serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest
possible degree of ethical conduct.
CODE, supra note 108, Preamble.
